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ABSTRACT: A commonly offered justification for patent trolls or non-
practicing entities ("NPEs") is that they serve as a middleman, facilitating
innovation and bringing new technology from inventors to those who can
implement it. We survey those involved in patent licensing to see how often
patent license demands actually led to innovation or technology transfer. We
find that very few patent license demands actually lead to new innovation;
most demands simply involve payment for the freedom to keep doing what the
licensee was already doing. Surprisingly, this is true not only ofNPE licenses
but even of licenses from product-producing companies and universities. Our
results cast significant doubt on one common justification for patent trolls.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent trolls-patent-holding entities that do not make any products but
sue or threaten others with patent infringement-are the subject of intense
debate. Congress is considering legislation to curb patent trolls, and many
scholars have worried that the growing prevalence of patent lawsuits filed by
trolls reflects a fundamental problem with the patent system. Defenders of
patent trolls, meanwhile, have argued that they are desirable intermediaries
that enable technology to move from the minds of inventors into the hands
of those who can make productive use of it.
A critical factual assumption that underlies this debate is whether patent
licensing by trolls is in fact a mechanism for technology transfer to the
licensees and the creation of new products, or whether a request that a
company take a patent license is simply a means of collecting money in
exchange for agreeing not to sue. The answer matters not only for the debate
over the desirability of patent trolls but for the health of the patent system
altogether. Patents are supposed to promote not just invention but
innovation-the development and deployment of new technology into the
world. If they are serving this function, we should expect to see troll patent
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licenses leading to the deployment of new products or at least creating the
proper environment for such deployment. If that is not happening, then
aspects of the patent system begin to look more like economic waste, a tax on
innovative companies being paid in part to inventors but increasingly to
intermediaries that themselves contribute little to society.
In this Article, we offer a first window on that critical factual question by
surveying people who actually engage in patent license negotiations to see
whether the deals they strike lead to new products or to technology transfer
or other markers of innovation. We find that very few patentee-initiated
license requests result in any innovation, whether we measure that directly by
looking for new products and features, or indirectly by looking for proxies
such as the transfer of technology, sharing of personnel, or the development
ofjoint ventures. Notably, our results seem to hold regardless of whether the
patent owner seeking a license is a patent troll, a product-producing company,
or a university. Based on our survey results, ex post patent licensing
negotiations seem to be almost entirely divorced from innovation. Because of
the small number of respondents, however, we encourage further research
before drawing definitive policy conclusions.
To be clear, we do not find or suggest that there is no technology transfer
occurring, or that the patent system cannot promote that technology transfer.
Universities and inventors can and do strike deals with companies that are
better positioned to implement the new ideas they develop, and these
alliances have, indeed, led to valuable drugs and other products. But those
deals frequently take place ex ante, before a patent issues and often before
patents are even filed. It is the technology being sold; the patents accompany
the sale of the technology. Ex post licensing demands and litigation-the
focus of our Article-seem less promising.
In Part II, we discuss the debate over patent trolls and the relevance of
technology transfer. In Part III, we explain our methodology. Part IV presents
our results, and Part V offers some tentative policy implications of those
results.
II. PATENT TROLLS AND PATENT LICENSING
Patent trolls are the hottest topic of debate within patent law today.
Trolls, also known as "non-practicing entities" ("NPEs") or "patent assertion
entities" ("PAEs"), are individuals or businesses that do not make any
products and instead make their money from licensing or asserting patents
against entities that do make products. While there is some debate as to who
fits in the troll category, under most reasonable definitions roughly half of the
1. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 1 13
COLUM. L. RE. 2117, 2118-21 (2013).
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patent suits filed in the last few years have been filed by trolls.- In some
industries, notably computers and telecommunications, the percentage is
much higher.s
Patent trolls are controversial. Many scholars, businesses, and
policymakers argue that patent trolls represent a tax on innovation because
they file costly lawsuits and obtain substantial settlements, but do not
contribute anything of their own to society.4 There have been substantial
efforts to cut back on problematic lawsuits, both in the courts and in
Congress.5 Many of these efforts have been driven by concerns about the harm
to innovation done by patent trolls.
At worst, patent trolls may be collecting payments on patents that are
invalid, or not infringed. Given the economics of patent litigation, a rational
company may choose to pay a license fee and thereby avoid the costs and risks
of a lawsuit.6 The patent in that case is not benefitting society at all but rather
serving as a drag on innovation.
2. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia et al., UnpackingPatent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 9 9 MINN.
L. REV. 649, 651-52 (2014); Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities, 17 UCIAJ.L. & TECH. 1, 37 (2013). See generally Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls
by the Numbers (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. o8-I3, 2013), http://
papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2233041. The measurement is complicated not only
by different definitions of patent trolls but by the fact that until September of 2011 a party could file
suit against multiple defendants in a single case. Patent trolls tend to sue far more defendants than
practicing entities, often suing dozens at the same time. So studies before 2011 of lawsuits filed-as
opposed to the number of defendants sued-produced a misleadingly low measure of troll activity.
Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz, using a restrictive definition of a patent troll, still find that roughly
half of the assertions in both 2007 and 2012 were made by NPEs, though in 2007 many of those
assertions were bundled into a single suit. Cotropia et al., supra, at 687, 692-96.
3. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants,
99 GEO. L.J. 677, 691-92 (201 1). Allison, Lemley, and Schwartz are currently embarked on a
comprehensive study of how case outcomes differ between trolls and practicing entities. See
generally John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, How Often Do Trolls Win Patent
Suits? (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
4. See, e.g.,JAMES BESSEN & MICHAELJ. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOWJUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 144-47 (2008); FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 53 (2011), https://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-
remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/i loo7patentreport.pdf; Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman,
The GiantsAmong Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 25,41; Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent,
Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/1o/o8/technology/
patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html; Ashby Jones, Patent 'Troll' Tactics
Spread, WALL STREETJ. (July 8, 2012, 8:4 6 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB00014240527
02 3 03 2 9 2204 5 7 7 5 1 4 7 829 3 2 3 9 09 9 6.htnl; This American Life: When Patents Attack!, CHI. PUB.
MEDIA (July 22, 2011), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-
patents-attack.
5. See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Saving High-Tech Innovators from
Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, i13 th Cong. (2013).
6. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 1, at 2124 (noting the prevalence of this model).
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Defenders of patent trolls, by contrast, argue that they can serve as
business intermediaries between inventors and commercializers.7 The
traditional theory of the patent system posits that patents encourage
innovation by allowing inventors to exclude competitors from the market,
thereby earning supracompetitive returns and recouping investment.8 A
number of scholars have argued, however, that the patent system can
encourage commercialization of inventions by allowing the inventor to
control who can develop the technology.9 And if the inventor is not in a
position to commercialize the invention at all, in theory, patents can serve as
a mechanism that allows the inventor to provide her new idea to someone
who can make use of it. On this theory, patent trolls can serve an
intermediation function, helping to deliver good ideas to companies who can
put them to good use.-o One can think of this as the efficient middleman
7. Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm
Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451,470-72 (2004); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and
Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1818 (2007);
James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent
Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORYL.J. 189, 190 (2006); Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View
of Property Rights, 2o BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1519-20 (2005); Kristen Osenga, Formerly
Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 451 (2014);
Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory, Comment, The TrollNext Door, 6J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
292, 3o6-o9 (2007); Sannu K Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1 14, 118 (201o). For discussion of this patent market
idea, see, for example, St6phanie Chuffart-Finsterwald, Patent Markets: An Opportunity for
Technology Diffusion and FRAND Licensing?, 18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 335 (2014); Andrei
Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-
Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 53-56 (2013); Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case
Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (2014); Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired
Patents, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979 (2014)-
8. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 319-26 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-96 (1997).
9. Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1o65, lo67-69 (2007); accord Michael Abramowicz &John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 398-404 (2008); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-12 (2001); Ted Sichelman,
CommercializingPatents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 345 (2010).
10. Daniel F. Spulber, Intellectual Property and the Theory of the Firm, in PERSPECTIVES ON
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 9, 31 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012)
("Specialized intermediaries began to create a market for patented technologies in the late 1 9 th
and early 20th century .... This important development 'facilitated the emergence of a group
of highly specialized and productive inventors by making it possible for them to transfer to others
responsibility for developing and commercializing their inventions."); Daniel A.
Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 286-87 (2009) ("Troll defenders counter
that trolls are socially useful intermediaries between small inventors and commercialization.
Small inventors may not have the resources to engage in detecting infringers, licensing
negotiations, or patent infringement lawsuits against infringers. By buying up patents from small
inventors, trolls may 'spur innovation by investing in undercapitalized projects and reducing
transaction costs for small inventors who are routinely robbed by large corporations.'"); B. Zorina
Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic History and the Patent Controversy in the Twenty-First
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hypothesis. For this theory to work, however, patent trolls must actually
facilitate the use of the patented inventions. Our study attempts to examine
whether the activity of patent trolls does facilitate the development or use of
new technology. As described below, the results are not encouraging.
If patent trolls do not operate as efficient middlemen, perhaps they are
serving the social good as tax collectors for small inventors whose ideas have
been appropriated. Under this theory, the patent holder has properly
contributed to learning and dissemination by publishing its ideas in the form
of a patent, and the product company has simply taken the idea from the
patent's disclosure. The patent troll, therefore, would be operating as a tax
collector to facilitate the transfer of an appropriate payment to the person
who gave the idea to the world.
Several factors cast doubt on the appropriate payment theory, however.
First, much of the patent troll activity occurs in fast-moving technologies such
as computers and telecommunications where the patent is often on a
technology that bears little resemblance to the defendant's product. In these
circumstances, the patent troll asserts that the patent covers any means of
solving a problem, even if the defendant's implementation looks nothing like
the patentee's original idea.,1 The distance between the patent disclosures in
these cases and the accused product makes it unlikely that the company
making the product learned the idea from the patent's disclosure. The
hypothesis also assumes a level of quality in patents and adequacy of patent
disclosure that is generally not attributed to the modern patent system by
scholars and commentators.- Finally, the evidence suggests that the
overwhelming majority of patent cases do not involve alleged copying, but
rather independent invention.'3 If the parties taking patent licenses are doing
so to avoid being sued on technology they themselves developed
independently, the tax the patent system is imposing is a tax on one set of
Century, 21 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 825, 832 (2014) ("Specialized intermediaries are especially
valuable in new or emerging markets and in instances in which asymmetries of information and
other transaction costs are significant.").
11. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return ofFunctional Claiming, 2013 WIS.
L. REV. 905.
12. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-' 3-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE
PATENT QUALITY 45 (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1495, 1500-01 (2001); cf ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 52-53 (2012)
(describing limitations of disclosure in the modern patent system); BRIAN T. YEH, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R 4 2668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE "PATENT TROLLS" DEBATE 9 (2013) (describing
why "it is economically infeasible or irrational for [parties] to search through existing patents to
avoid infringement").
13. There is no independent invention defense in patent law, and the vast majority of
patent lawsuits are filed not against those accused of copying the invention from the patentee but
against other inventors who came up with the same idea independently. See, e.g., Christopher A.
Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2009) (finding
that allegations of copying are quite rare in patent cases).
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inventors (those who actually put their inventions to good use) for the benefit
of another set of inventors (those who did not). That is hard tojustify.'4
Under these circumstances, patent licensing does not benefit society by
encouraging learning or dissemination of the patentee's invention. The
dissemination of that technology was already happening, no thanks to the
patentee; the patent troll is just collecting a tax from people who not only
came up with the idea on their own,'5 but actually put the invention into
practice.
One could argue that in its tax collector role, patent trolls are at least
returning dollars to original inventors, thereby encouraging innovation by
facilitating the rewards that the patent system promises to those who invent
and disclose.' 6 In the absence of technology transfer, however, it is reasonable
to question how much society wants to invest in moving money from one
independent inventor to another. Further, studies suggest that such rewards
are not flowing. In what economists are calling the "leaky bucket," only an
estimated 20% of the payments to NPEs get back to the original inventor or
into internal research and development by the NPE.'7 And there is some
evidence that the prospect of later patent licenses is not what motivates many
inventors, particularly in universities.' 8
If patent trolls are not returning much to original inventors, it will be
particularly important to see if their activity is leading to new innovation.
Otherwise, all of this patent assertion and licensing activity may simply be a
14. If independent invention is widespread, it may suggest that the bar for obviousness is
set too low within the patent system. In other words, if others can develop an idea without the
benefit of the inventor's wisdom, perhaps we are not seeing wisdom but rather an advance that
is obvious to those in the art. Cf Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82
ST. JOHN's L. REV. 39, 94-96 (2oo8); Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infiingement
Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1534-35 (2007) (arguing that evidence of
independent invention should be a factor pointing toward obviousness). Courts in a prior era
had given more credence to this evidence. See, e.g., Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S.
177, 185 (1925) (stating that independent inventions "within a comparatively short space of
time . . . are in themselves persuasive evidence that this use ... was the product only of ordinary
mechanical or engineering skill").
15. Some independent invention occurs after the patentee invents, but before the patent has
issued. Other independent invention occurs even before the patentee invents, but it may not bar the
later inventor from patenting if the first inventor kept the idea secret. See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES
&JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 50g-11 (4 th ed. 2007).
16. Trolls may be intermediaries in this very different sense-not transmitting new technology
to licensees and defendants, but facilitating suit by individuals or small companies who could not
otherwise afford to sue. See, e.g., Stephen H. Haber & Seth H. Werfel, Why Do Inventors Sell to
Patent Trolls? Experimental Evidence for the Asymmetry Hypothesis (Apr. 27, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2 5 5 2 7 3 4 (finding evidence in
controlled experiments to support this hypothesis).
17. SeeJames Bessen & MichaelJ. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPEDisputes, 99 CORNELLL.
REV. 387, 411 (2014); Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 482-83 (2014)-
18. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of University
Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALEJ.L. & TECH. 285 (2014).
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tax on current productivity with relatively little return to the innovation
ecosystem.
Thus, in evaluating the social welfare contribution of patent trolls, we
would like to know whether their patent licensing actually results in new
products, learning, or technology transfer by licensing targets. The value of
that information is not limited to contributing to the patent troll debate.
Practicing entities also license their patents to others. Mark Lemley and Doug
Melamed have suggested that trolls are not themselves the problem, but
rather a symptom of larger problems with the patent system.'9 It makes sense
to ask not merely whether patent trolls are actually facilitating innovation
through after-the-fact patent licensing, but whether practicing entities are as
well.
Our goal in this Article is to begin to shed light on this critical question.
To do that, we decided to ask the people who know-the ones who enter into
such licensing agreements.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this Part, we describe the methodology of our survey, along with the
limitations of survey methodology in general and of this study in particular.
We developed a tree of questions to be presented to survey respondents.
After developing a draft question tree, we tested the questions using two
attorneys at separate large law firms and two academic colleagues. Each
academic tester held both aJ.D. degree and a Ph.D., and also had extensive
experience in sociology and in empirical studies. The attorney testers had
active practices advising product companies who receive patent licensing and
litigation demands. Given the potential to discuss study intent and approaches
with the testers, we chose as testers attorneys at law firms, rather than attorneys
at product companies, to avoid the possibility of tainting any study
participants.
These testers provided suggestions for improving question clarity and
ensuring neutrality of the wording, and we revised the survey questions
accordingly. After finalizing the questions and study approach, the study was
given clearance by a regulatory opinion of the Western Institutional Review
Board, which determined that the study fit the exemption criteria for human
subjects research under 45 C.F.R. § 4 6.1oi(b) (2).20
The survey was distributed to attorneys who work in-house at product
companies. We chose in-house attorneys at product companies because they
are best positioned to know whether their company actually implemented
new technology as a result of a licensing deal or negotiation. Contacting
ig. Lemley & Melamed, supra note i, at 2121. For discussions of patent privateering and
the blurring of the line between trolls and practicing entities, see, for example, Ewing & Feldman,
supra note 4, at 60-70; John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement's Historical Survivors,
26 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 545, 557-72 (2013).
20. A full copy of the survey instrument is attached as Appendix B.
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licensing lawyers who send demands but who do not work at product
companies runs the risk that the lawyer will hope or assume that the licensing
target adopted a new technology without having any first-hand knowledge on
the matter.
There is some risk that the recipients of licensing demands may be
motivated to understate the effect of those demands, skewing our results. We
think this is unlikely, however. First, the motivation to bias the results of an
academic survey seems weak. Second, licensing lawyers in product-producing
companies tend to negotiate both as patent owners and as potential licensees
in different cases, so they are less likely to suffer from systematic bias than
lawyers who only negotiate for one side.21 Nonetheless, future researchers
might want to survey the lawyers making licensing demands. At the least, any
discrepancy between their accounts and the accounts of licensees would
suggest some bias in one cohort or the other that would need to be taken into
account. As we note above, however, we think it is the licensee-user, not the
licensor, who is likely to have better information on the use the licensee made
of the technology.
We separated product companies into i 1 different industry sectors.
These sectors were identified based on the work of Mark Lemley and his co-
authors John Allison and David Schwartz, who broke patent lawsuits into
different functional industry categories.2o The i 1 industry sectors are:
Computers & Other Electronics; Semiconductor; Pharmaceutical; Medical
Devices, Methods & Other Medical; Biotechnology; Communications;
Transportation; Construction; Energy; Goods & Services for Industrial &
Business Uses (i.e., goods and services for wholesale uses that are not in
another category, including business method inventions); and Goods &
Services for Consumer Uses (i.e. goods and services for retail uses that are not
in another category, including business method inventions). We asked
participants to identify their companies according to those i i industry
sectors.
The surveys were administered through Qualtrics, a survey firm. All
information was anonymized and aggregated for publication here. In
addition, all responses were anonymized so that even the authors could not
see any identifying information about respondents. Respondents were asked
whether they would be willing to participate in future research and, if so, to
provide contact information. That contact information was provided to the
authors separate from any individual survey responses.
The surveys themselves were distributed in a variety of ways. First, we
emailed surveys to in-house attorneys-identified using a database from
21. Future research might explore this potential bias by trying to pair the descriptions given
by licensors and licensees. Doing so would necessarily sacrifice anonymity, however, and so is
unlikely to be feasible.
22. Seejohn R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEx. L.
REV. 1769, 1178-79 (2014) (developing these categories and explaining them in detail).
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Hoover's D&B (commonly referred to as Dun & Bradstreet). The database
was mined in order to identify survey participants who could represent 1 1
different industry sectors (Appendix A, Column i) in the United States. The
ii different industry sectors were created by mapping the appropriate
"Hoover's Industries" categories onto the industry sectors (Appendix A,
Column 2).
The participants were chosen based on whether theirjob title was related
to the relevant legal profession. The following Hoover's "Job Function"
categories were utilized to select participants in 1o out of the i i categories:
Vice-President Legal, Contract Law, Contract Manager, Corporate & Business
Law, Corporate Counsel/Legal, Group & Corporate Practice, Legal
Executive, Counsel, Attorney, Commercial Law, General Counsel, General
Legal Practice, and Patent Law. For the 1 ith industry sector (Goods &
Services for Industrial & Business Uses), the number of legal professionals was
very large and therefore the list of participants was chosen from only the
following categories, which are a subset of the previously mentioned set: Vice-
President Legal, Contract Manager, Corporate & Business Law, Corporate
Counsel/Legal, Legal Executive, Attorney. Where time and information
permitted, phone calls were made to the company to identify the proper
recipient and to request participation in the survey. The search results were
filtered further-using Hoover's People Search Results based onjob function
and its position on Hoover'sJob Function list, beginning with the function in
the highest position and progressing to the lowest-to ensure that no more
than a handful of people at any single firm would receive the survey. There is
a risk that more than one person at a single firm could have responded to the
survey, which would over-represent a single company's experience. We have
described this risk and the way it was addressed in the limitations discussion
below.
The Hoover's D&B database represents the most comprehensive
commercially available collection of companies. Nonetheless, it, like every
database, has limitations. It may overrepresent large and medium-sized
companies at the expense of startups. The fact that we surveyed legal and
contract managers may further skew our study towards companies large
enough to have at least one lawyer or contract manager, which will exclude
very small startups. Our study is therefore best understood as a study of
established companies rather than startups.2 3
23. Other work has surveyed startups for their experience with patents. See, e.g., StuartJ.H.
Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2oo8 Berkeley Patent
Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009); Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls (Santa
Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. oc9-12, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sOI3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=2146251; cf Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from
the Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 279-80 (2014) (surveying venture
capitalists to learn how patents affect startups).
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In addition to the Hoover's D&B recipients, links to the survey were
posted for in-house counsel groups. These were posted using Linkedln or
other affinity groupings for a total of i2 groups. We used a different survey
link for each group, including for the Hoover's D&B group. This allowed us
to compare the results of each group so that if any questionable activity by
respondents or any anomalies in the data occurred, we would have the
opportunity to identify it. For example, given the intense interest in this area
and the open nature of the surveys, it would be possible, in theory, for a
respondent to try to affect the data by submitting multiple responses or by
enlisting others to do so. Isolating the responses from the different group
postings allowed us to monitor for data that might widely and inexplicably
vary from responses received from other groups. If such a variation had
occurred, we could have looked further to try to determine if characteristics
of the variant group might have led to different responses or if we should be
concerned about possible data manipulation. No major discrepancies
emerged.24
Roughly two-thirds of the total responses received came from either the
Hoover's D&B participants or from the group titled "In the House."
Approximately 1o to 2o responses each came from the following groups:
American Bar Association Corporate Counsel Committee, High-Tech Law
Group, InHouse Legal, In-House Counsel, and Internet Association. The
following groups generated fewer than ten responses each: Mobile Marketing
Association, Telecomm Counsel, Generals of the Revolution, Silicon Valley
Leadership Group, e-Legal In-House, Computer and Communications
Industry Association, and CPF. Groups that did not generate any responses
are not listed here or included in the study results in any way. As described
above, participants were asked to classify their company within i of i
industry groups. This allowed us to compare responses across industry groups.
Researching any topic through voluntary survey responses carries
significant limitations. Responses can by skewed by who chose to respond,
creating limitations for reaching conclusions that are accurate for the entire
population. For the topic of patent assertion, those who choose to respond
may be those who have had particular types of experiences with patent
assertion or who hold views sufficiently strong for them to be willing to spend
time answering questions. The resulting nonresponse bias can move the
results of the sample away from the characteristics of all companies
nationwide. That said, we take some comfort in the fact that many of our
respondents had not in fact encountered licensing efforts or lawsuits,25
24. One group with fewer than ten responses had a significant overrepresentation in the
number of respondents marking that their company had received more than 50 patent licensing
or settlement requests per year. However, these responses represent a very small subset of the
data not affecting the overall results, and the rest of these respondents' answers are not noticeably
out of line with the data.
25. See infra Part IV.
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suggesting that the respondents were not limited to those with a particular set
of experiences. But we cannot be sure that the respondents are a
representative sample of all companies.
Responses to the type of survey questions in this study are also not
independently verifiable by the researchers. Survey responses are based on
the respondent's recollections, which may be limited by memory effects,
subjective perceptions, and conscious or subconscious biases. In an area that
is the subject of considerable public debate at the moment, these perceptions
can have an impact on respondent's responses.
Posting on groups also created the risk that individuals could fill out
more than one survey. We did eliminate some duplicate responses from the
results, where in all cases it appeared that the respondent had failed to finish
the survey in one submission and then completed it in the other entry. Of
course, it is possible that an individual still could have completed more than
one survey inadvertently, perhaps by using different devices or accounts.
Given how difficult it is for any individual to take the time to complete survey
questions, however, we find it unlikely that this could have occurred. A more
likely risk, however, concerned the possibility that more than one individual
at a particular company could have completed a survey, which could over-
represent that company's experience in the results. There is some reassurance
from the respondents who volunteered to provide additional information in
the future. A large number of respondents answered that they would be
willing to participate in additional research and provided contact
information. Looking at that list,. there were only two companies that had
more than one respondent. This makes it less likely that the problem was
widespread, but such possibilities could not be eliminated. Finally, it is
certainly possible that respondents could have chosen inaccurate answers or
engaged in repeat surveys to intentionally distort the study. Although that risk
cannot be eliminated from any voluntary survey, we were able to mitigate this
risk by creating a different survey link for each group. This made it more likely
that we would be able to identify odd results. It also made it less likely that any
data manipulation could extend across the full sample set.
Most important, it is critical to highlight the limitations of the low
response rate and small sample size. The response rate is complicated by the
fact that we provided links to certain associations of in-house counsel to allow
their members to respond. Because we did not distribute those latter surveys
directly to prequalified individuals, we cannot assess how many people
considered responding to the survey but ultimately did not do so. A small
response rate increases the risk of selectivity bias among those who do
respond.
In addition, many of the questions have a response rate lower than the
entire sample of 181 respondents. For example, only a subset of respondents
(g7) worked at companies that had received patent demands. Of those, not
all respondents had received patent demands from each category of patent
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holders (NPEs, universities, competitors, etc.). Thus, questions about patent
assertions from each of those subgroups will have a lower response rate than
the subset of g7. And those responders represent a variety of industries. Thus,
the sample is small enough that statistical significance should not be inferred
from any of the results.
Despite these limitations in sample size, the results offer some
quantitative progress towards understanding whether innovation results in
response to modern patent assertion. We believe this anecdotal and
observational information provides a useful insight into an area that has been
shrouded in secrecy. In particular, the paucity of available information on this
topic and the difficulty of collecting such information make our survey a
useful starting point, and one that we hope other academics and government
actors will continue to pursue and expand.
IV. RESULTS
A. EXTENT AND DISTRIBUTIoN OF SUITS AND LICENSING REQUESTS
In this Part, we summarize the results of our survey. We first asked
respondents whether in the last five years, their company had received any
licensing or settlement requests from a patent holder. These were defined in
the question to include either calls or letters doing any of the following:
suggesting areas of mutual interest or joint ventures, offering to license
patents, threatening litigation, giving notice of intent to file an infringement
lawsuit, or noticing the filing of an actual infringement lawsuit. Fifty-four
percent of the respondents had received such calls or letters.
Figure i. Respondents Receiving Patent Licensing or Settlement Requests
No Yes
46% 54%
Notably, because the focus of our study was on the efficient middleman
hypothesis as applied to patent trolls, our study focused on licensing requests
or threats initiated by the patent owner. We did not study circumstances in
which companies reached out to patent owners to seek a license to particular
technology or to partner in developing an idea. New innovation and
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technology transfer may be more likely in those latter circumstances.
Those who had received licensing or settlement requests in the past five
years were spread across all industry sectors. The largest groupings, however,
were in the categories of Goods & Services for Consumer Uses and Computer
& Other Electronics, which accounted for 21% and 20% of responses,
respectively. Other larger groupings included Industrial Goods & Services
(15%) and Communications (14%). Three other categories included 6-7%
of the respondents each: Semiconductors (7%); Pharmaceuticals (7%); and
Medical Devices, Methods & Other Medical (6%). The remaining sectors-
Biotechnology, Transportation, Construction, and Energy-each had smaller
percentages of the respondents who had received patent licensing or
settlement requests.
F"igure- 2. Re-spondi ents Classified 1by Industiy
Goods & Services for Consumers 4
21%















Most of the respondents that had received requests were large
companies. Seventy percent had annual revenue of over $ioo million. The
remainder of the respondents who had received requests were evenly spread
at six to nine percent across other annual revenue categories.
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Figure 3. Respondents' Annual Revenue
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The location of company headquarters for respondents was not
surprising. Respondents who had received licensing or settlement requests
were largely headquartered in the major innovation sectors of the country.
Thirty-one percent were in Northern California, and another 4% in Southern
California. Groupings from 5-8% were in other states that have significant
innovation sectors including New Jersey (8%), New York (8%), Texas (8%),
Illinois (6%), and Georgia (5%). Smaller groupings came from Delaware
(4%), Virginia (4%), Pennsylvania (3%),Wisconsin (3%), Connecticut (2%),
Maryland (2%), Minnesota (2%), Washington (2%), Colorado ('%), Kansas
('%), Louisiana ('%), Massachusetts (1%), Michigan ('%), and New
Hampshire (1%).26
Of those who had received requests, roughly half had received requests
from one to five times a year. Roughly one-quarter had received such requests
less than once a year. Interestingly, a segment of the respondents seemed to
draw a strikingly high number of licensing and settlement requests. Twelve
percent received requests 11 to 50 times a year, and another four percent
received more than 5o requests a year. This is consistent with prior
suggestions that patent assertions are not evenly distributed across all
companies and industries, but are concentrated in certain sectors of the
economy.7 It also gives us further comfort that our results are not driven by
a few companies with a particular interest in patent license demands.
26. For an argument that innovation in many industries is geographically concentrated,
and that patent law can use that fact to develop judicial centers of expertise, see generally Jeanne
C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (soo).
27. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARKA. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 49-65 (2009) (discussing the industry-specific nature of patent enforcement).
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Figure 4. How Often Were Respondents Approached with Patent
Licensing ,and Scit tI itien R Pequests?
More than 5o times per year
4%
11-50 times p
tess rhan once a year
6-10 times per year
8%
1-5 times per year
48%
Respondents were asked to identify the type of party initiating the
licensing or settlement requests and the percentage of requests that came
from each type of entities. Respondents were given the choice of selecting:
(i) competitors; (2) product-producing companies that are not competitors;
(3) entities or individuals whose core activity involves licensing or litigating
patents, or NPEs;2S (4) universities; or (5) nature of party is unclear.29 For
about 6o% of the respondents, the majority of requests came from entities or
28. Colleen Chien has dubbed these entities "patent assertion entities," distinguishing
them from other forms of NPEs such as individual inventors and universities. Colleen V. Chien,
From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System,
62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2so). We use the broader term NPE because asserters in this survey
category include individual inventors and companies who developed the idea but never turned
it into a product. Nonetheless, it is worth bearing in mind that our NPE category excludes
universities even though they are not strictly product-producing companies. See generally Mark A.
Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61 1 (2008).
29. As an aside, the design of this question allows us to distinguish between product-
producing companies that are acting to protect their competitive interests and product-
producing companies that are acting more like NPEs interested in generating revenue from
outside the line of business. Cf Lemley & Melamed, supra note 1, at 2146-66 (noting that
practicing entities can often behave in ways similar to trolls). Prior studies of patent trolls have
been unable to distinguish the two without investigating the technology of each lawsuit in detail.
See, e.g.,John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated
Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16-19, 31-32 (2oo9); Cotropia et al., supra note 2, at 654, 679-82.
The line between competitive and noncompetitive companies is not always clear, however. It is
possible, for example, that a competitor's suppliers might choose to assert patents in an effort to
improve the competitive posture of its own chain of production. If that were the case, part of the
activity in the category of product-producing companies that are not competitors could represent
an attempt to protect competitive interests.
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individuals whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents.so More
than two-thirds of that 6o% received all or almost all of their licensing
requests from NPEs.s'
The survey then asked respondents to provide information on those
requests for patent licenses or settlements. The questions separated the
information into the five types of parties who might have initiated responses:
(1) competitors; (2) product-producing companies that are not competitors;
(3) entities or individuals whose core activity involves licensing or litigating
patents; (4) universities; or (5) nature of party is unclear. In other words, we
asked for the same information about the respondent's experiences with each
of the five categories of parties who could have initiated requests. The survey
covered both information about the ultimate resolution of the request and
information about whether a lawsuit was filed.
On the litigation information, we asked respondents to consider those
cases in which a request led to a patent license. For those cases, we asked how
often a lawsuit was filed prior to reaching the license agreement. Again, the
questions were asked separately for each type of party that might have
initiated the request.
The majority of requests did not lead to settlement agreements, no
matter what type of party initiated the request. Specifically, the majority of
respondents answered that requests led to a patent license from zero to ten
percent of the time regardless of whether litigation was initiated. That result
suggests that actually taking a license is rare. That in turn means that in many
instances a licensing request is either ignored or refused after negotiation32
Thus, one respondent explained that "[w]e did not take any offered licenses."
Both competitors and those whose core activity is licensing and litigating
patents fared somewhat better than others in seeking licenses. In the case of
requests from competitors and NPEs, roughly half of the respondents
reported that requests led to licenses in the "rare" category of zero to ten
percent of the time. When universities and product-producing companies
that were not competitors initiated the requests, almost three-quarters of
respondents in each category reported that requests rarely led to licenses.ss
3o. Not all respondents who answered the question also included a percentage. The figure
above reflects the 60 respondents who specified a percentage. To be conservative, we did not
count those who responded with 50% as indicating that a majority of requests came from those
whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents.
31. Specifically, 72% of the 6o% who received a majority of requests from entities or individuals
whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents-or 43% of the whole group of those who
had received requests from any kind of entity-had received at least go% of the licensing requests
from entities or individuals whose core activity involved licensing or litigating patents.
32. This is consistent with Lemley's suggestion that in many instances companies simply
ignore patents. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 22 (reporting the
received wisdom among licensing lawyers that one should always "ignore the first cease-and-desist
letter one receives").




For those requests that led to licenses, we also asked how often a lawsuit
was filed prior to reaching a settlement agreement. The responses suggest that
most licensing from requests such as these occurs outside the courthouse34
Specifically, our survey showed that in the experience of most respondents,
when requests led to patent licensing, lawsuits were rarely filed first. For
example, 61% of respondents suggested that when requests from competitors
led to patent licenses, a lawsuit was filed first zero to ten percent of the time.
For requests from product-producing companies that are not competitors,
75% of respondents said that a lawsuit was filed first zero to ten percent of the
time; and for requests from universities, 82% of respondents said that a
lawsuit was filed first zero to ten percent of the time.
Interestingly, the experience of most respondents with NPEs was
somewhat different. In the experience of most respondents, when requests
that came from NPEs led to patent licenses, lawsuits preceded a license more
frequently. In particular, only 48% of respondents noted that lawsuits were
filed rarely when requests led to licensing-as compared to 61% with
competitors.35
Put another way, only 27% of respondents said that competitors filed
lawsuits in a majority of the cases in which requests led to licensing. In
contrast, 40% of respondents said that NPEs filed lawsuits in a majority of
cases prior to a settlement.
From either perspective, it appears that NPEs more often filed lawsuits
prior to settlements. This could suggest that NPEs more often feel the need
to file lawsuits in order to get companies to take a license because the
companies are less willing to deal with them. It could also suggest, however,
that NPEs are more aggressive in their licensing behavior, choosing to file first
and talk later.36 This notion, that NPEs are more aggressive and resort to the
courthouse more frequently, echoes other anecdotal discussions of NPE
behavior as well as studies suggesting that the percentage of patent litigation
34. This type of response dovetails with other studies suggesting that on the 
whole most
requests for patent licenses never progress to the stage of a lawsuit. See Feldman et al., supra note
2, at 32. The study notes that the 2013 White House Report on Patent Assertion cites conservative
estimates of "the number of patent threats in 2012 at 6o,ooo with the actual number more likely
over 0oo,ooo." Id. Comparing even the more conservative number of patent demands with the
roughly 5000 lawsuits filed in 2012, one can conclude that "more than 90% of patent demands
never reach the courthouse door." Id.; cf Lemley, supra note 12, at 1507 (estimating without data
that there are five times as many patents licensed for a royalty as there are infringement suits filed).
35. The rough comparison holds up across all categories of responses. For competitors, the
responses were: o-io% filed first (61%); 10-25% filed first (s I%); 25-50% filed first (3%); 50-75%
filed first (3%); 75-1oo% filed first (24%). For entities and individuals whose core activity involves
licensing or litigating patents, the responses were: o-io% filed first (48%); 10-25% filed first
(9%); 25-50% filed first (3%); 50-75% filed first (9%); 75-100% filed first (31%).
36. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term
Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 1309, 1354 (2013); cf
Ronald A. Bleeker & Michael V. O'Shaughnessy, One Year AfterMedlmmune-The Impact on Patent
Licensing &Negotiation, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 431-32 (2008) (suggesting this strategy).
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filed by NPEs has risen in recent years. In short, regardless of the reasons for
it, respondents suggest that NPEs resort to the courthouse more frequently.
B. DID LICENSING LEAD TO INNOVATION OR TECHNOLOGY TRANS1ER?
Startups and established companies often seek knowledge, information,
or know-how from others, and that often accompanies a patent license.37
Economic literature suggests that technology transfer is often more
complicated than the simple license of a patent. It includes the transfer of
know-how, "complementary assets,"3 8 and other "peripheral disclosures."39
The focus of our study and the most important part of the results
concerned whether the licensing that resulted from such requests led to any
innovation or technology transfer, rather than licensees simply paying for the
freedom to operate as they were already doing. As described above, to explore
this question, we looked for indicators that might suggest innovation is
occurring through this licensing activity. We call these factors "markers of
innovation." The markers of innovation include direct indicators of
innovation, such as whether the companies added new products or features
with the technology they licensed. We also included indirect markers of
innovation, including whether the patent holder transferred any know-how
or anything else along with the patent license.4o Thus, we asked whether the
patent holder transferred technical knowledge, and we also asked whether
the patent holder transferred personnel (for example through a consulting
agreement). Finally, particularly mindful of the ways in which innovation
37. See Graham et al., supra note 23, at 1317.
38. See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POLY 285, 293 (1986).
39. See generally Jason Rantanen, PeripheralDisclosure, 74 U. PITr. L. REV. 1 (2012).
40. It is well established in the economic literature that effective technology transfer
requires informal know-how and secrets as well as the technology publicly described in the patent.
See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMics OF INNOVATION AND
CORPORATE STRATEGY (2oo1) (estimating that the markets for technology are much larger than
the market for patent licensing); Teece, supra note 38, at 288-9o (explaining that returns to IP
often depend on informal know-how and "complementary assets"). That is particularly true in
light of evidence that patents do not actually serve to disclose much knowledge to scientists, in
part because of the delay in issuing them and in part because of deliberately opaque patent
drafting. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function ofDisclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV.J.L.
& TECH. 401, 403 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, iso MICH. L. REV. 709,
745 (2012) ("Simply put, inventors don't learn their science from patents."); Doug Lichtman,
Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. LJ. 2013, 2023
(2005) ("[Vlery few people read patents outside of the litigation and licensing contexts.");John
M. Olin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 1 18 HARV. L. REV. 2007,
2019-20 (2005) ("[M]any innovators have ceased using patents as a research tool . . . ."). Even
supporters of disclosure theory like Fromer acknowledge that "a good deal of evidence suggests
that technologists do not find that [patents] contain [] pertinent information for their research."
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 56o (2oog). But cf Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Do PatentsDisclose UsefulInformation?, 25 HARv.J.L. &TECH. 545,603 (2012) (surveying
scientists and finding that some, albeit a minority, do learn from patents).
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progresses from university licensing, as well as across product companies at
times, we also asked whether ajoint venture was created along with the patent
license.
We wish to emphasize once again that our survey studied companies who
received unsolicited licensing requests from third parties. We did not survey-
and do not report-on the practice of entering into technology transfer
agreements before embarking on development of a new technology. Those
agreements undoubtedly exist, particularly with universities but also among
product companies, and they often involve the transfer of patent or trade
secret rights along with the technology.
1. NPE Licenses Do Not Produce Technology Transfer
The responses suggest that licensing requests from NPEs rarely lead to
any markers of innovation. With particular unanimity, respondents reported
that licenses taken from NPEs rarely led to any new products or features.
Specifically, 92% of respondents reported that they added new products or
features from the technology they licensed from NPEs zero to ten percent of
the time and only two percent of respondents indicated they developed new
products more than 25% of the time. In other words, although much of the
activity related to requests for licensing or settlement requests originated from
NPEs, the resulting licenses lead to few, if any, product advancements. And it
is quite possible that those few companies who did develop a new product as
a result of NPE patent assertions did not make an improved product, but
simply chose to design around the patent to minimize the obligation to pay
for a license to products in the future.41 In other words, those few instances
41. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1995-2004 (2007) (modeling the optimal response to patent litigation, which often
involves designing around the patented invention); see also FELDMAN, supra note 12, at 40-74, 212
(describing patents as an opportunity to bargain and including a chapter on how modem patents
operate). Design-arounds can be valuable. Indeed, designing around a patent is an expected and
even desirable part of the patent system. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
U.S. 17, 36 (1997) (contrasting "the intentional copyist making minor changes to lower the risk
of legal action" with "the incremental innovator designing around the claims, yet seeking to
capture as much as is permissible of the patented advance"); see also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead
Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Designing around patents is, in fact, one of
the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress
in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose."); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d
1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called 'negative
incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even when they are patented, thus bringing
a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace."); Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in
Patent Law, 16 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 1045, 1050 & n.17 (2001); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim
Interpretation, 14 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 1, 40-41 (2000) ("The practice of designing-around extant
patents creates viable substitutes and advances, resulting in competition among patented
technologies. The public clearly benefits from such activity."). But a design-around is valuable to
society only if it generates socially useful new technology. If it is simply an arbitrary change to
avoid a patent, the expenditure in designing it is socially wasteful.
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of new product development may involve socially wasteful product changes
rather than true innovation.
Figure 5. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from NPEs Led to the
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The results were even stronger when respondents were asked about
indirect markers of innovation. With almost complete unanimity, respondents
who took licenses from NPEs rarely received technical knowledge, transfer of
personnel (including consulting agreements), or joint ventures along with
the patent license. Thus, when companies licensed patents from NPEs, the
indirect markers that might suggest even the potential for future innovation
were almost entirely absent.
This result is consistent with the comments we received from survey
respondents in the open-ended comment sections. Thus, one respondent
wrote: "None of the lawsuits which we settle result in anything other than a
pure patent license (i.e., no tech transfer)." Another wrote: "Virtually every
license my company has taken has been to ensure freedom of action for
products or services we already offer. We have never received any value from
a patent license other than to avoid litigation." A third offered the view that
NPEs "do not have any of the details worked out and they do not put any
capital at risk developing any product, service or market. NPEs simply exact a
tax. .. ."
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Figure 6. The Frequency That NPEs Transferred Technical Knowledge in
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Figure 8. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from NPEs Led to the
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We note, in particular, that the category we are describing as NPEs in our
results was described in the survey only as "entities and individuals whose core
activity involves licensing or litigating patents." One might have expected that
the presence of individuals in this category might have resulted in at least
some transfer of knowledge or even consulting agreements, given that such
individuals may have been the original inventors of the technology. The
knowledge that is so important for translating patents into viable products
and features may be lost in the transfer from inventors to entities that
aggregate patents, but one would expect that knowledge to exist with the
original inventors and that evidence of the sharing of such knowledge would
emerge along with the patent license. Our results suggest this is not the case.
It is certainly possible that respondents did not properly understand the
question and answered only with entities in mind, rather than individuals. The
fact that respondents were lawyers and most likely patent lawyers, however,
might argue against such a lack of precision in responding to the questions.
A more likely explanation is that because NPEs often enforce patents
relatively late in their life,42 they often approach licensing targets well after
the technology has been independently developed and implemented.43
Indeed, in fast moving fields like computers, the four to five years it takes a
42. Love, supra note 36, at 1331-32 (showing that most NPE suits are filed near the end of
a patent's 2o-year life, while most practicing entity suits are filed near the beginning).
43. Cotropia & Lemley, supranote 13, at 1424 (finding that over go% of patent suits filed against
independent inventors and 98% in the IT industries do not involve any allegations of copying).
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patent to issue44 means that by the time there is a patent to be licensed the
technology is most likely obsolete.45
2. University and Practicing Entity Licenses Rarely Generate Technology
Transfer
The most striking information that emerged from the survey, however,
was the following: while NPE licenses were extremely unlikely to lead to new
products or be accompanied by other markers of innovation, ex post licensing
demands from practicing entities and universities were also unlikely to
generate technology transfer. In other words, patentee requests for patent
licenses or settlements led to remarkably few markers of innovation regardless
of the type of party that initiated the request. In particular, roughly three-
quarters of respondents answered that when requests for a license or
settlement led to a licensing agreement from these categories of patent
holders, the technology they licensed led to new products or services zero to
ten percent of the time. This was true in the case of competitors, product
companies that were not competitors, and even universities.
Figure 9. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from Competitors Led to the
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44. Dennis Crouch, Total Patent Application Pendency, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 18, 2012), http://
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/total-patent-application-pendency.html (noting that the
average and median total pendency is just under five years"). The number has increased over the
past 15 years; in 1998 the average delay was 2.77 years. John R Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's
Patenting What?An Empiical Exploration ofPatent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 21 18 (2000).
45. For a discussion of the potential implications for the innovation system in rewarding in
the case of independent invention, see supra text accompanying notes 6- 18.
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Figure lo. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from Product Companies
That Were Not Competitors Led to the Creation of New Products or













Figure 11. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from Universities Led to the
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The results were even more dismal for the indirect markers of
innovation. When requests for licenses and settlements led to licenses,
companies rarely received technical knowledge, transfer of personnel
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competitors, product-producing companies that were not competitors, or
universities led to patent licenses, 88% or more of respondents reported that
the patent holder transferred knowledge, in addition to the license, zero to
ten percent of the time.
Figure 12. The Frequency That Competitors Transferred Technical














Figure 13. The Frequency That Product-Producing Companies That Were
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Figure 14. The Frequency That Universities Transferred Technical









In addition, when requests from competitors, product-producing
companies that were not competitors, or universities led to patent licenses,
94% or more of respondents reported that the patent holder transferred
personnel (including through consulting agreements) zero to ten percent of
the time.
Figure 15. The Frequency That Competitors Transferred Personnel in
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Figure 16. The Frequency That Product-Producing Companies That Were












Figure .17. The Frequency That Universities Transferred Personnel in
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Finally, when requests from competitors, product-producing companies
that were not competitors, or universities led to patent licenses,joint ventures
were even less likely. Ninety-one percent or more of respondents reported
that the patent holder created ajoint venture zero to ten percent of the time.






Figure 18. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from Competitors Led to
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Figure 19. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from Product-Producing
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Figure 2o. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from Universities Led to the
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The university results were particularly surprising. Given the storehouse
of knowledge in university minds, one would expect such licenses to be
particularly fruitful for future innovation at companies. That certainly may be
true when companies initiate contact themselves by seeking out university
technology. And it may be true when universities or university professors set
out to market a new technology rather than a patent license. When
universities initiated the contact through licensing requests, however, indirect
markers of innovation were largely absent. Little, if any, transfer of knowledge
or transfer of personnel occurred, including consulting agreements, nor were
joint ventures created.4 6
C. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AMD LICENSING BY INDUSTRY
In the discussions of modern patent licensing requests, much ink has
been spilled about whether the experience of the technology industry is
different from the experience of the life sciences.47 In order to explore this
question, we compared the results of surveys from key industry respondents.
46. This is consistent with anecdotal reports that university licensing is increasingly 
about
freedom to operate rather than actual technology transfer. Lemley, supra note 28, at 615 ("Time
and again, when I talk to people in a variety of industries, their view is that universities are the
new patent trolls. One even referred publicly to universities as 'crack addicts' driven by 'small-
minded tech transfer offices' addicted to patent royalties.").
47. See, e.g., Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio &
Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 773, 785-808 (2014) (describing and refuting
conventional wisdom that the biopharmaceutical industry is safe from patent trolling). See
generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 27.
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Specifically, we compared the responses of those in the Computer & Other
Electronics industry who had received requests for licensing or settlements,
to the responses of those in the Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology, and Medical
Devices, Methods & Other Medical groups (collectively referred to as "Life
Sciences"). The Computer & Other Electronics industry group accounted for
20% of the respondents, and the combined Life Science group accounted for
14% of the respondents. Given that the number of respondents in these
categories is far smaller than the number of respondents for the full data set,
we list the actual numbers as well as the percentages for each area described
below, in the interests of transparency, and we note that any observations
should be tempered by the small sample size.
Respondents were asked to describe the type of party that initiated the
licensing or settlement request and the percentage that came from each type
of entity. As described above, not all respondents who provided information
about the type of party who initiated the request also provided a percentage.
In particular, only 6o respondents provided a percentage. Those numbers
become quite small in the specified categories. Thus, only seven respondents
each volunteered percentage information in the Computer and Life Science
categories. Of these, more Computer respondents reported receiving a
majority of requests from NPEs than did Life Science respondents-four for
Computer versus two for Life Sciences. These numbers, however, are far too
small to draw even reliable inferences.
Slightly more information can be gleaned from looking at the full set of
respondents who identified the type of party that had initiated any licensing
or settlement requests at all, even those who did not go on to specify a
percentage from each. From this larger group, 15 of 19 Computer
respondents (79%) indicated that they had received at least one request from
an NPE, while only 6 of 14 of Life Science respondents (43%) indicated that
they had received at least one request from an NPE.
Respondents in both the Computer categories and the Life Science
categories were strikingly united in their experiences when taking a license
from entities and individuals whose core activity involves licensing or litigating
patents. Both categories reported that new products or features were rare. In
fact, ioo% of respondents in both the Computer and Other Electronics
category and the combined Life Sciences category reported that when
licensing or settlement requests led to licenses, the technology they licensed
resulted in adding new products or features zero to ten percent of the time.




Figure 21. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from NPEs Led to the
Creation of New Products or Features with the Technology Licensed,
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Figure 22. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from NPEs Led to the
Creation of New Products or Features with the Technology Licensed,
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The response was precisely the same for the Computer and Life Sciences
categories on the question of whether such licenses led to indirect markers of
innovation-knowledge transfer, transfer of personnel (including consulting
agreements), or the establishment of joint ventures. Again for both the
Computer and Life Science categories, ioo% of respondents reported that
[Vol. 101:137168
2015] DO PA TENT LICENSING DEMANDS MEAN INNOVATION? 169
licensing or settlement requests from NPEs that led to licenses, knowledge
transfer, transfer of personnel, or the establishment of joint ventures
occurred zero to ten percent of the time.
Figure 23. The Frequency That NPEs Transferred Technical Knowledge in
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Figure 24. The Frequency That NPEs Transferred Technical Knowledge in
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Figure 25. The Frequency That NPEs Transferred Personnel in Addition to
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Figure 26. The Frequency That NPEs Transferred Personnel in Addition to
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Figure 27. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from NPEs Led to the
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Figure 28. The Frequency That Patent Licenses from NPEs Led to the
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Looking at the addition of new products or features for licenses from
competitors, product-producing companies, and universities, the amount of
direct innovation is still discouraging, although slightly better than all
respondents as a whole. No fewer than two-thirds of respondents in the
Computer and Life Science categories reported that licenses led to the
addition of new products or features in zero to ten percent of the cases-
regardless of whether the requests came from competitors, product-
IOWA LAWREVIEW
producing companies who were not competitors, or universities. The
comparable number for all respondents as a whole was roughly three-quarters
in each category.4 8
On the question of new products or services, the answers were similar for
respondents in the Computer and Life Science industries when requests came
from competitors. Four out of six Computer respondents reported new
products or services zero to ten percent of the time, while six out of nine Life
Science competitors reported new products or services zero to ten percent of
the time. With product-producing companies that were not competitors, two
out of three Life Science respondents added new products or features zero to
ten percent of the time. Nine of nine Computer respondents added new
products or services zero to ten percent of the time after taking a license from
product-producing companies that were not competitors.
When universities sought licenses, eight of nine Life Science companies
added new products and services only zero to ten percent of the time.
Similarly, two of three Computer companies added new products or services
zero to ten percent of the time when universities sought licenses and the
company took a license.
The indirect markers of innovation were still discouraging, although
slightly better for some markers of the Life Science category than in the
Computer category. The most discouraging results can be seen for licenses
when the request came from universities and the companies took a license. In
almost every category of indirect markers for both the Life Science and
Computer industries, ioo% of respondents reported indirect markers of
innovation only zero to ten percent of the time. This included transfer of
knowledge, transfer of personnel (including consulting agreements), and the
creation ofjoint ventures. For these categories, there were nine Life Science
respondents and three Computer respondents. The only variation from this
picture was one Computer respondent who reported transfers of technical
knowledge 25% to 50% of the time.
In the case of indirect markers of innovation for licenses from
competitors, respondents in the Life Sciences industry reported slightly better
experiences than for respondents from the Computer industry. Nevertheless,
the Life Sciences numbers still show that markers of innovation were rare in
most licenses from competitors among respondents.
The same holds true for indirect markers of innovation in the Life
Sciences industry for licenses from product-producing companies that are not
competitors. Again, the numbers are better for the four Life Science
respondents than for the nine Computer respondents.
In short, answers from respondents in the Life Sciences industry and the
Computer industry were similar, on the whole. Both direct and indirect
48. Again, the number of respondents in each of these categories was quite small, ranging
from three to nine respondents.
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markers of innovation are scarce. In the case of licenses from NPEs,
respondents in the Life Sciences and the Computer science industries
reported strikingly similar experiences. For both industry groups, ioo% of
respondents reported few, if any, direct or indirect markers of innovation
when they took licenses from NPEs. Given the many discussions of
dissimilarities between the Computer and Life Sciences industry,49 we found
this result surprising, although we note, again, the small number of
respondents in these subcategories, which makes generalization risky.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Based on our very preliminary evidence, the theory that NPEs facilitate
innovation via patent license demands either through the creation of new
products or by delivering actual technical know-how from inventors to
implementers does not seem to hold water. Our survey responses showed that
NPEs almost never actually provided any valuable information to their
licensees, and they rarely, if ever, prompted the development of any new
products. Licensees in our survey are paying for freedom to operate-the
right not to be sued for implementing technology they developed on their
own but which someone has asserted will fit within their patent rights.50 Thus,
the study does not support the efficient middleman hypothesis for
characterizing the role of NPEs.
We do not find this particularly surprising. It is consistent with our
personal experience with NPE licensing and litigation. It is also consistent
with prior evidence that suggests that, outside the pharmaceutical industry,
those targeted in patent lawsuits are almost always independent inventors
rather than companies accused of copying from the patent owner.5' And it
makes perfect sense given the long delays at the Patent and Trademark Office
and the fact that NPEs tend to assert their patents late in their life, after the
defendant's technology has proven successful.52 The combination of those
two factors means that when a company receives a licensing demand from an
NPE, it is likely for a patent based on old technology. Indeed, in fast-moving
technologies like computers and telecommunications the patent is often on a
technology that bears little resemblance to the defendant's product; the NPE
49. See supra note 47.
50. While there is strong evidence that almost all defendants in most industries are
independent inventors, not copiers, we cannot exclude the possibility that while our respondents
did not obtain technology or know-how directly from the patentee, they learned the technology
through indirect channels that ultimately trace back to the patentee. See generally Robert P. Merges,
A Few Kind Wordsfor Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Sch. of Law
Working Paper, 2014) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=246 4 756 (making
this point). While we are skeptical that this happens often with NPEs, our data do not allow us to
address the question directly.
51. Cotropia et al., supra note 2, at 655.
52. Love, supra note 36, at 1312.
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asserts that the patent covers any means of solving a problem, even if the
defendant's implementation looks nothing like the patentee's original idea.ss
More surprising to us are our findings that neither practicing entities nor
even companies in the life sciences do much more technology transfer along
with their patent licensing activity. While both practicing entities and life
sciences companies in particular engaged in more technology transfer to our
survey respondents than NPEs, our results suggest that the modal license
signed by those companies is not part of a deal that communicates any know-
how or drives new innovation, but is merely a payment for freedom from a
patent lawsuit.
That result, if generalizable, suggests that ex post patent demands are not
serving much of an innovation promotion function at all, even in the
industries in which we would expect significant technology transfer.54 That
does not mean technology transfer never happens; it does.5s But it may mean
that technology transfer happens early in the life of a technology, and that
secrets, collaborations, and informal know-how, not patents, are the primary
focus of real technology licensing agreements. Patents (or, more likely, patent
applications) may well be part of those technology transfer deals, and
ownership of patent rights may even be a goal of the deal, but the deal is not
being driven by the desire to take a patent license.
The results are also surprising in regard to universities. In the 1980 Bayh-
Dole Act, Congress allowed universities to elect ownership of inventions
funded by federal dollars and to take on the responsibility for licensing those
inventions.56 University academics, at least in high-tech industries, are not
generally motivated to invent by the prospect of patents.57 The most
compelling justification for that major policy shift was that for some types of
inventions, exclusive rights are necessary for commercialization and that
universities would be in the best position to facilitate that licensing. Such
licensing and commercialization would, in theory, lead to the introduction of
53. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note i 1, at 951-52.
54. For a discussion of the lack of strong empirical evidence that patents are driving
innovation, see generally Stuart Macdonald, When Means Become Ends: Considering the Impact of
Patent Strategy on Innovation, 16 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 135 (2004); Simone Rose, Further Reflections
on Extinguishing the Fountainhead of Knowledge: A Call to Transition to the "Innovation Policy" Narrative
in Patent Law, 66 SMU L. REV. 60g (2013).
55. ARORA ET AL., supra note 40, at 93-95.
56. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3018 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2012)).
57. See, e.g., Love, supra note 18, at 286 ("The prospect of obtaining patent rights to the
fruits of their research does not appear to motivate university researchers in high-tech fields to
conduct more or better research.... University patent programs may, instead, actually reduce
the quantity and quality of university research . . . .").
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new products, thereby giving society a benefit from the federal dollars spent
on research.58
Our results cast some doubt on the validity of this logic in the case of
certain types of university activity. In particular, our results suggest that some
universities are approaching product companies, not to create joint ventures
or promote the creation of new products, but to seek ex post licenses for
already commercialized technology. If a company is willing to commercialize
under a nonexclusive license, or no license at all, this casts doubt on some of
the logic underpinning Bayh-Dole and on the role that the federal
government is expecting universities to play.59 This does not mean universities
are not engaged in technology transfer; surely they are. Universities generate
a large number of new inventions, and they spin out companies that make
innovative new products.o But patent licensing may only be incidental to that
transfer, as university scholars start companies or take their ideas to existing
companies. In most such cases the start-up or acquiring company is interested
in buying the technology, perhaps including buying the patents, not simply
in taking a nonexclusive license to those patents. The more recent university
practice of suing or demanding licenses from existing companies appears
much less likely to be driving innovation by or technology transfer to the
recipient of the license demand.
We do not think our data suggest that patents serve no useful purpose.
The classic justification for patents, after all, is not to encourage technology
transfer but to allow practicing entities to exclude competitors from the
marketplace.6' Our evidence casts no doubt on that justification. And the
hope of future patents may spur innovation that does become the subject of
technology transfer. Venture capitalists ("VCs") may view the ability to sell
patents as a sort of consolation prize, allowing them to capture some value
from failed start-ups.62 The VCs in one study vigorously disagreed, however,
58. For discussions of the rationales for Bayh-Dole and some of their criticisms, see, for
example, DAVID C. MOWERYETAL., IVORYTOWERAND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 85-98 (2004); Lorelei Ritchie de
Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOus. L. REV. 1373, 1412
(2007); Lemley, supra note 28; Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University
Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS,
DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005); John Allison et al.,
University Software Ownership: Trends, Determinants, Issues (Sept. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), https://law.wustl.edu/clieg/documents/ipconfo 5 /lausanne.version.pdf
59. See Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Ex Ante March-In Rights: A Market Test for
Bayh-Dole Patents (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
6o. For estimates of university patent licensing revenue, see, for example, sources cited in
Lemley, supra note 28, at 614 n.io.
61. Lemley, supra note 8, at 993-96.
62. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 137 (2000). For a somewhat skeptical discussion of this possibility, see Maria
Leonor Cabanelas & Chaitanya Ramachandran, The Secondary Market in Patents: Help or Hindrance
for Start-Ups?, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., March/April 2015, at 79. But any such benefit comes at a
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with one VC explaining, "VCs swing for the fences; they are not interested in
pennies on the dollar." 63 Further, Michael Risch has argued that we may need
the threat of troll suits to induce product-producing companies to transact
with NPEs who can actually transfer technology rather than stealing that
technology from them. 64 As Jessica Silbey has observed, patents can serve a
variety of functions.65 We do not intend a full assessment of all of them here.
But NPEs, universities, and practicing companies that are licensing
patents in areas in which they are not practicing cannot defend their assertion
of patents on the ground that they are excluding competitors from the
marketplace and therefore recouping additional investment. If their licensing
of patents is contributing to social welfare, it must be because it encourages
either innovation or the dissemination of information that would not
otherwise be available to the world. And the evidence from our survey results
suggests that some of the commonly asserted ways in which patents might
encourage innovation-by facilitating new products or technology transfer-
are not borne out.
Companies are increasingly spending significant amounts of time,
resources, and creative energy responding to ex post patent assertion both
inside and outside of litigation. Our results suggest that this vast amount of
activity is largely unproductive, no matter who initiates it-an NPE, a product
company or a university. Ex post licensing may be promoting transactions, but
not necessarily economically efficient transactions.66
cost to the next generation of start-ups, who may face demands from the trolls who bought the
last generation. Id. See generally Chien, supra note 23.
63. SeeFeldman, supranote 23, at 278-79 (noting that 65% of venture capitalists in a survey
disagreed with the following statement: "[A]s a venture capitalist, in making funding decisions, I
consider the potential for selling patents to patent assertion entities if the companies fail").
64. Risch, supra note 7, at loo6-12; see also Haber & Werfel, supra note 16, at 2-4, 19-20.
65. See generally Jessica Silbey, Patent Variation: Discerning Diversity AmongPatent Functions, 45
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 441 (2013).
66. As Rob Merges explains: "[T]here is also a problem with the argument that all trolls are
just market makers and hence beneficial to economic activity. Not all arbitrage exchange is in
fact efficient and socially desirable." Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-
Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1588 (2009); see also Michael J.
Burstein, Patent Markets: A Framework for Evaluation (Working Paper, 2015), http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract~id=2590375 (questioning when transactions in patent rights are
socially productive).
Notably, the conclusion that these transactions are unproductive holds even if the patents in
question are valid and infringed. This is a set of assumptions that has been called into question
by a number of scholars. For descriptions of how the NPE business model can generate returns
when patents are invalid or improperly asserted, see Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs,
18 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 250, 261-63 (2013). See generally Bessen & Meurer, supra note 17; Ewing
& Feldman, supra note 4; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41; Morton & Shapiro, supra note 17.
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But before we conclude that the patent system is not working, or that it
is working only for practicing entities that want to exclude their competitors
from the market, we should gather more data. Our survey is limited, both in
the number of respondents and because of its low response rate. There may
be other, underrepresented sectors of the economy in which patent-based
technology transfer is significant. Or we may have found an unrepresentative
subset of technology companies to survey. We also note that even within the
panoply of patent licensing, we have examined only certain aspects. For
example, our study did not examine the licensing that occurs when a product
company initiates the approach to a patent holder seeking new technology.
Nor does it study the substantial cross-licensing activity taking place between
competitors.6 7 And it does not cover sales of patents. Our intent is to follow
up with a more comprehensive survey in the near future. In the meantime,
our data offer the first ever window into the role of patent licensing in
facilitating technology transfer and the development of new technologies by
the licensee. And the preliminary picture is not an encouraging one.
67. For a discussion of the economics of that cross-licensing, see, for example, Lemley &
Melamed, supra note i, at 2129-46; Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 73-74 (2005).
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APPENDIX A
INDUSTRY SECTOR HOOVER'S INDUSTRIES
Computer Hardware Manufacturing
Education & Training Software
Contract Electronics Manufacturing
Engineering, Scientific & CAD/CAM Software
Networking & Connectivity Software
Security Software
Computer & Other Wireless Software
Electronics Audio & Video Equipment Manufacturing
Consumer Electronics Manufacturing
Electronic Toys & Games Manufacturing
Electronic Equipment Repair Services
Gaming Equipment Manufacturing




Semiconductor Discrete & Passive Semiconductor Manufacturing




Medical Devices, Health Care Products Manufacturing
Methods & Other HVAC Equipment Manufacturing
Medical Health Care Management Software
Biotechnology Product Manufacturing
Scientific Research & Development Services
Biotechnology Research Services
Biotechnology Research Equipment Manufacturing







Electric Power Transmission, Distribution & Marketing
Electric Utilities
Natural Gas Distribution & Marketing
Energy Oil & Gas Exploration & Production
Oil & Gas Field Services
Oil & Gas Well Drilling
Petroleum & Coal Products Manufacturing
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Accounting & Finance Software
Business Intelligence Software
Database & File Management Software
Development Tools, Operating Systems & Utilities
Software
E-commerce Software




Geophysical Surveying & Mapping Services
Information Technology Services
Testing Laboratories
Arts, Entertainment & Recreation Sector
Goods & Services for Consumer Products Manufacturing





Qi In the last five years, has your company received patent licensing or
settlement requests? (These could be calls or letters suggesting areas of
mutual interest or joint ventures, offering to license patents, threatening
litigation, giving notice of intent to file an infringement lawsuit, or noticing
the filing of an actual infringement lawsuit.)
o Yes
o No
Q2 On average over the past five years, how often has your company
received patent licensing or settlement requests?
o Less than once a year
o 1-5 times per year
o 6-1o times per year
0 11-50 times per year
o More than 50 times per year
Q3 What parties initiated these requests (approximate percentage for
each category)?
o Competitors
o Product-producing companies that are not competitors
o Entities or individuals whose core activity involves licensing or
litigating patents
o Universities
o Nature of the party was unclear
Q4 What percentage of competitor requests led your company to take a






Q5 When competitor requests led to a patent license, how often was a
lawsuit filed prior to reaching the licensing agreement?
o o-1o% lawsuit filed first
o 10-25% lawsuit filed first
o 25-50% lawsuit filed first
o 50-75% lawsuit filed first
o 75-100% lawsuit filed first
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Q6 When competitor requests led to a patent license, how often did you
create new products or features with the technology you licensed (e.g., as






Q7 When competitor requests led to a patent license, how often did the






Q8 When competitor requests led to a patent license, how often did the







Q9 When competitor requests led to a patent license, how often was a






Qio What percentage of requests from product producing companies
(that are not competitors) led your company to take a patent license, whether








Q1 When requests from product producing companies (that are not
competitors) led to a patent license, how often was a lawsuit filed prior to
reaching the licensing agreement?
o o-io% lawsuit filed first
0 10-25% lawsuit filed first
o 25-50% lawsuit filed first
o 50-75% lawsuit filed first
o 75-100% lawsuit filed first
Q1 2 When requests from product producing companies (that are not
competitors) led to a patent license, how often did you create new products
or features with the technology you licensed (e.g., as opposed to merely taking






Q13 When requests from product producing companies (that are not
competitors) led to a patent license, how often did the product producing
company (that is not a competitor) transfer technical knowledge in addition






Q14 When requests from product producing companies (that are not
competitors) led to a patent license, how often did the product producing
company (that is not a competitor) transfer personnel in addition to the
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Q15 When requests from product producing companies (that are not
competitors) led to a patent license, how often was ajoint venture created in






Qi6 What percentage of requests from entities or individuals whose core
activity involves licensing or litigating patents led your company to take a






Q17 When requests from entities or individuals whose core activity
involves licensing or litigating patents led to a patent license, how often was a
lawsuit filed prior to reaching the licensing agreement?
o o-lo% lawsuit filed first
O 10-25% lawsuit filed first
0 25-50% lawsuit filed first
0 50-75% lawsuit filed first
o 75-100% lawsuit filed first
Q18 When requests from entities or individuals whose core activity
involves licensing or litigating patents led to a patent license, how often did
you create new products or features with the technology you licensed (e.g., as







IOWA LAWREVIEW IVol. 101:137
Qig When requests from entities or individuals whose core activity
involves licensing or litigating patents led to a patent license, how often did
the entity or individual whose core activity involves licensing or litigating






Q20 When requests from entities or individuals whose core activity
involves licensing or litigating patents led to a patent license, how often did
the entity or individual whose core activity involves licensing or litigating







Q2 1 When requests from entities or individuals whose core activity
involves licensing or litigating patents led to a patent license, how often was a






Q22 What percentage of requests from universities led your company to
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Q23 When requests from universities led to a patent license, how often
was a lawsuit filed prior to reaching the licensing agreement?
o o-io% lawsuit filed first
o 10-25% lawsuit filed first
0 25-50% lawsuit filed first
0 50-75% lawsuit filed first
0 75-100% lawsuit filed first
Q24 When requests from universities led to a patent license, how often
did you create new products or features with the technology you licensed







Q25 When requests from universities led to a patent license, how often







Q26 When requests from universities led to a patent license, how often
did the university transfer personnel in addition to the patent license (e.g.,






Q27 When requests from universities led to a patent license, how often







Q28 What percentage of requests from parties whose nature was unclear







Q29 When requests from parties whose nature was unclear led to a patent
license, how often was a lawsuit filed prior to reaching the licensing
agreement?
o o- o% lawsuit filed first
o 10-25% lawsuit filed first
0 25-50% lawsuit filed first
o 50-75% lawsuit filed first
o 75-100% lawsuit filed first
Q3o When requests from parties whose nature was unclear led to a patent
license, how often did you create new products or features with the
technology you licensed (e.g., as opposed to merely taking the license to cover






Q3i When requests from parties whose nature was unclear led to a patent
license, how often did the party whose nature was unclear transfer technical
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Q32 When requests from parties whose nature was unclear led to a patent
license, how often did the party whose nature was unclear transfer personnel






Q33 When requests. from parties whose nature was unclear led to a patent






























































Q35 What is your company's annual revenue?
o $o-$5 Million
0 $5 Million-$io Million
o $io Million-$5 0 Million
0 $50 Million-$ ioo Million
o $ioo Million +
Q36 What is your company's primary business sector?
0 Computer & Other Electronics
o Semiconductor
" Pharmaceutical





1V01- 101:1371 8 8
2015] DO PA TENT LICENSING DEMANDS MEAN IANOVATION?
o Energy
o Goods & Services for Industrial & Business Uses (i.e. goods and
services for wholesale uses that are not in another category,
including software-implement business method inventions)
o Goods & Services for Consumer Uses (i.e. goods and services for
retail uses that are not in another category, including software-
implement business inventions)




Q38 Please provide contact information in the box below. (Note: All
survey data is anonymous. Contact information will not be associated with
individual survey responses.)
Q39 If you would like to elaborate on your answers to any of the questions
above, please add your comments here.
I 8g
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